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CRIMINAL LAW AND THE PUBLIC
The recent action of the courts of the state of Michigan in
the case of one Fred Palm, who was convicted under the habitual
criminal act of that state, brings to the fore a question that should
be a momentous one if the acts designed to punish persons for
the commission of a series of felonies are to continue on the statute books. Under the Michigan law a man who has been convicted of three felonies, must, if convicted of a fourth, no matter
what this fourth may be, receive a sentence of life imprisonment.
The fact that none of the felonies would have carried with it
such drastic punishment is not a proper point for consideration
under such a law. In the instant, case this is demonstrated.
Fred Palm, the defendant, had previously been convicted of three
felonies, and now was found guilty of having a pint of gin in his
possession. The ownership of the contraband liquor is in itself
a felony in that state, and so the defendant found himself facing
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life imprisonment as a result of the statute.
Regardless of the question as to the constitutionality of the
particular law under which Palm was convicted, the query as to
the propriety of the classification of felonies in the American
states presents itself. To insist that the ownership of a pint of
gin is a felony under such circumstances is an absurdity. Heretofore, the classification of acts as misdemeanors or as felonies
has meant little, except that it determined the residence of the
prisoner While incarcerated. It has been for some time merely
an arbitrary division of the acts prohibited by law. The norm of
mal.um in se has not been applied, had the designation of an act as
a felony did not necessarily mean that it was a grave transgression of the law, likely to seriously affect the security of the state.
Contrarywise, the fact that an act is a misdemeanor at the present time is no safe indication that it does not constitute a
more serious charge than some felonies undoubtedly are. As we
have noted, the nomenclature used has meant very little until
this time.
That such a division or classification becomes of major import under such statutes as the Michigan habitual criminal act
(vhich is comparable with those existing in several other states)
is axiomatic. Presumably, the law wishes to protect society
from further harm by these men. Therefore the intention of the
legislators was that the felonies making up the chain in such a
case as this should be such as militate against the security and
essential decency of society. That they could have intended anything else does not seem quite possible.
The criterion is then, the protection of society. Can it be
said that the possession of a pint of gin is such a matter as would.
justify the incarceration of a man for life, even when tacked to
a previous record of three convictions? Could the possession of
the liquor be taken to prove a recalcitant disposition of such a
nature that the denial of liberty is necessary for the peace and
dignity of the commonwealth? We think that it will not be
hard to answer these questions in- the negative.
No one contends that this extraordinary punishment is given
merely because of the last offense. That would be error. But
the fact that the fourth offense must be classed as a felony at law
and must be proved as such, makes it an indenspensable part of
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the case for the prosecution. Therefore, whether or not the
legislature may have meant to pave the way for such a holding,
the fact is that they have done so. The one way to rectify the
error, if the statute is to be retained, is to reclassify crimes and
to arrange the classification in such a manner that those acts
denominated as felonies will be of such a character as to justify
the extreme penalty meted out to those who are cohvicted of
such offenses for a fourth time. In other words, the commoh
sense of the proposition would suggest the return to the principle
that only things clearly malum in se are to be felonies.
Which brings before us the dissatisfaction that is everywhere being evidenced with the workings of the criminal laws of
the states. That such a movement is afoot is undeniable. That
it is gaining strength is not to be controverted. So far the lawyers are the only persons who, as a body, have not become agitated with this problem. This is quite natural, as their training
has led them to believe in a gradual transition rather than a sudden change.
There is danger in too strict an adherance to such an attitude,
however, and it lies in this: that the laity is too apt to take
upon itself the task of reforming the criminal law and procedure.
If a genuine betterment of conditions could be affected by such
lay action we would hold no brief against it; but the fact that
it would end in confusion with greater chaos miliates against it.
The revision is a matter to be made by the legal profession. They
are specially trained for such action.
No doubt the legalist is right in holding that the province of
affecting such a change belongs to him rather than to the gentlemen of the press, or to the various associations and commissions
that seem to make it their business. But unless the lawyer asserts his right and investigates the charges thoroughly, remoulding where needed, the people acting through their chosen representatives, the legislature, will take the burden upon their shoulders with a result that the reformed procedure, though temporarily
expedient, in the final act will be disastrous to all and perhaps
most pernicious in its effects upon the legal profession. The
day for smug assurance that all will right itself in time is gone.
The agitation grows with leaps and bounds every day. The
-j. P. M.
lawyer must perform his duty.

